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为了验证这三个假设，本文选择 2007 年至 2014 年中国 A 股上市公司作为初始






























M&A is an important part of the operation of listed companies, and has great 
influence on companies’ existence, development and growth. As the actual core 
leaders, executives take significant and direct responsibility for M&A. Therefore, 
taking the indicators that evaluate the performance of M&A into consideration is 
helpful to establish a complete and effective compensation incentive system, which 
would be important to restrict the opportunistic behavior of executives as well as 
guide them to perform due diligence and make rational M&A decisions. Goodwill 
impairment is subjected to the fair value of the acquiree, and is therefore a potentially 
ideal indicator of M&A performance. This paper attempts to explore the practical 
application of goodwill impairment in the establishment of executive compensation 
plan, to make supplements to the existing literature and to provide reasonable 
suggestions. 
By reviewing the existing literature of M&A performance, goodwill impairment, 
the relation between executive compensation and M& A performance, etc., based on 
the agency theory and the compensation contract theories, this paper put forward three 
assumptions: first, there is a negative correlation between goodwill impairment and 
executive compensation; second, the larger the M&A scale is, the more negative the 
correlation is; third, executives can use their power to weaken the negative impact of 
goodwill on their compensation. In order to verify these three hypotheses, this paper 
chooses China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as samples, uses Stata12 
to analyze the panel data by conducting statistical analysis and regression test to 
explore the relation between goodwill impairment and executive compensation, and 
studies the role of M&A scale and executive power in this relation. Through empirical 
tests, it is concluded that the goodwill impairment will significantly reduce the cash 
compensation of executives, that executive power can reverse this negative impact, 
and that large M&A scale can mitigate the above-mentioned negative impact slightly, 
which is opposed to the second hypothesis. In this regard, the following suggestions 
are made: on the one hand, it is necessary to strengthen the supervision to improve the 
accuracy of the goodwill impairment, making it a reliable measure of M&A 
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III 
restrict their power properly and then help to keep the incentive mechanism of 
compensation plan working effectively. 
The contributions this paper tries to achieve are as follows: firstly, this paper 
studies the impact of goodwill impairment on executive equity compensation of 
Chinese A-share listed companies. Secondly, in analyzing the relationship between 
goodwill impairment and executive compensation, the scale of the M&A project 
which has goodwill impairment is introduced as a moderator. Then, in the further 
study, this paper extends the sample period to 2015, to examine the relationship 
between goodwill impairment and executive compensation in a longer observation 
period. At last, this paper adds a new dimension to the measure of executive power, in 
order to evaluate the executive power and its moderating effect more fully.  
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中的 8 个公告日的超常收益，发现并购活动对并购方未造成明显影响。 
另一些学者认为，并购业绩会随时间发生变化。如 Gregory（1997）发现，
并购事件发生后的 2 年内，样本的平均累计超常收益为负，而将窗口放大到 4 年
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